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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to address the lack of knowledge in the water industry of how policy 
development can be understood to have shaped the development and application of 
European Union (EU) drinking water policy. In particular, the paper develops a 
comparative understanding of how policy development can be viewed as having 
affected the development and application of the Drinking Water Directive 
(80/778/EEC) in England/Wales and the Republic of Ireland. As a result of this focus, 
the paper explores policy development issues relating to conflicting interests, invalid 
causal theories, political symbolism, lack of attention to detail by policy makers, and 
the allocation of duties and resources. It is subsequently established that consideration 
of these issues is useful in fostering a focused understanding of how policy 
development may have affected policy application. Despite the significant changes 
which took place with regard to the development of the current Drinking Water 
Directive (98/883/EC), the paper concludes by arguing that greater attention should be 
accorded the conflicting interests and abilities of Member States during the 
development of EU water policy, particularly if attempts are to be made to identify 
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measures targeted at improving the application of EU water policy in a diverse 
political and economic union of member states.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Accepting that polices are rarely made in a rational manner does not prevent the 
researcher from wanting to explore how policy is developed and how this affects 
policy application (Winter, 2003; Carter, 2007). Research focusing on the application 
of public policy has shown that resultant policy failures and problems are attributable 
to the conflicting interests of policy-makers. While such an acceptance is useful it 
offers a somewhat blinkered view of the consequences of policy development. In 
addition to conflicting interests, Winter (2003) suggests that invalid causal theories, 
political symbolism, lack of attention to detail by policy makers, and allocation of 
resources, are all important issues to consider when seeking to better understand how 
policy development may affect policy application. Therefore, this paper argues that 
exploration of the aforementioned issues offers a means by which to gain insights into 
the developmental stage of European Union drinking water policy and how this stage 
has in turn affected the application of such policy.  
 
To explore the impact of policy development on application, this paper is split into 
three main sections. The first section provides an overview of the Drinking Water 
Directive 80/778/EEC and its application. This second section provides a brief 
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overview of the methodological approach used to undertake the study, whilst the third 
section focuses on exploring issues of conflicting interests, invalid causal theories, 
political symbolism, lack of attention to detail by policy-makers, and the allocation of 
duties and resources, to glean insights into how policy development may have 
influenced the application of Directive 80/778/EEC in England and Wales and in the 
Republic of Ireland
1
.  
 
THE DRINKING WATER DIRECTIVE  
The Drinking Water Directive (80/778/EEC), adopted on the 15
th
 July 1980, 
established, for the first time, EU-wide parametric standards for water intended for 
human consumption. Prior to the Directive, Member States had set their own national 
standards. The Directive was developed and subsequently adopted by Member States 
in an attempt to standardise drinking water quality parameters across the EU (CEC, 
1980; NSCA, 2000; Collins, 1988; Haigh, 1998).  
 
Directive 80/778/EEC was plagued by delays and misinterpretations that served to 
affect its adoption and subsequent enforcement. In particular, Member States were 
meant to have implemented the Directive by 1982 (CEC, 1980). However, a report 
produced by Ken Collins, former Chair of the European Parliament Environment 
Committee, commented that: 
‘Not a single Member State had communicated to the Commission the 
legislative, regulatory or administrative measures taken to comply with 
                                                 
1
 For conciseness, from this point onwards, England and Wales are referred to as 
England/Wales, whilst the Republic of Ireland is referred to as Ireland. 
 
 Final draft of paper accepted for publication in the Journal ‘Water Policy’. Actual journal publication 
should be referenced. 
 
the directive by the end of the two-year period allowed for the directive’s 
transposition in national law’ (Collins, 1988: 29). 
 
Collins highlights that by 1987, the Commission had initiated legal proceedings 
against Belgium, France, Germany and Ireland for failure to implement the Directive. 
As Table 1 demonstrates, by 1998 it appears that all Member States affected by the 
Directive had put in place measures to ensure correct legal transposition. However, 
1985 was to mark the year Member States were meant to be compliant with the 
Directive but, as Table 1 indicates, in 1998 no Member State was compliant with the 
parameters detailed in the Directive. As Table 2 illustrates, Member States appeared 
to be exhibiting failure across a selection of the Directive’s parameters. Furthermore, 
Table 3 not only draws attention to the problem parameters and rates of non-
compliance in Member States but also draws attention to the differing approaches 
used to ensure compliance with the Directive. This is evidenced by the varying 
availability of national drinking water reports. Indeed, when Table 3 is studied 
further, varying approaches to compliance sampling are evident. For example, some 
Member States (e.g. Belgium and Germany) chose not to report on certain standards, 
either deliberately or because they were insufficiently monitoring to ensure 
compliance with the Directive.  
 
METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
The research from which this paper has been extracted adopted a qualitative approach 
to the analysis of the application of Directive 80/778/EEC in England/Wales and 
Ireland. Data was collected from a series of semi-structured interviews conducted in 
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England/Wales, Ireland and Brussels. The semi-structured interview approach 
allowed a series of predetermined questions to be developed, which could then be 
expanded upon during the interview if an interesting comment needed further 
exploration. Interviewees were initially selected from interviewee articles in 
professional publications, related academic research literature, and direct liaison with 
current individuals involved in the provision of water services. The interviewee base 
was then expanded via a process of snowballing
2
.  
 
All interviews were conducted under an umbrella of confidentiality and were 
subsequently made anonymous. Interviewees were selected to represent the 
organisations and individuals involved in the application of Directive 80/778/EEC. In 
Ireland, a total of 19 interviews were undertaken with individuals from the 
Department of the Environment and Local Government (DOELG) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Individuals from the providers of water 
services were also selected for interview, which included Dublin City Council, Fingal 
County Council, Rathdown County Council, and South Dublin City Council. In 
England/Wales, a total of 33 interviews were undertaken with individuals from the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Office of Water Services 
(Ofwat), the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI), and WaterVoice. Representatives of 
the providers of water services in the London area, namely Thames Water and Three 
Valleys Water, in addition to individuals from national representative groups such as 
Water UK, were also selected for interview. At the EU level a total of 12 individuals 
                                                 
2
 This process involved asking interviewees for recommendations of who could be 
interviewed next.  
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were interviewed, being drawn from the EC and the European Parliament (EP). 
Individuals were also selected for interview from the European Union of National 
Associations of Water Suppliers and Waste Water Services (Eureau). All interviews, 
with the exception of one, were conducted in person, with the length of interviews 
ranging from 30 minutes to over 2 hours.  
 
Where possible, interviewees were selected to help generate a contemporary 
understanding of the application of Directive 80/778/EEC between 1975 and 2002. 
This was undertaken to ensure that the initial policy development process and changes 
in application practice could be analysed over time. The information collected was 
supplemented with information derived from reports and papers from parliamentary 
committees and proceedings, government departments, EU organisations and 
institutions, privately commissioned research, interviewee articles and conference 
presentations. The Times and Irish Times were also consulted to aid in the 
construction of a contemporary picture of policy application.  
 
POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND DIRECTIVE 80/778/EEC 
To allow insights into how the policy development stage affected policy application, 
the following discussion is split into five sub-sections that seek to explore the impact 
of conflicting interests, invalid causal theories, political symbolism, poor attention by 
policy-makers, and the allocation of duties and resources to the application of the 
Drinking Water Directive 80/778/EEC in England/Wales and Ireland.  
 
Conflicting interests and the Directive  
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Member States unanimously adopted Directive 80/778/EEC on 15
th
 July 1980 (CEC, 
1980). However, it is important to note that at the time of adoption, the text of 
environmental directives had to be agreed upon unanimously (Cini, 2007). Therefore, 
such unanimity should not be taken as implying that the Directive was adopted 
without Member States entering into a process of bargaining and negotiation that 
sought to resolve conflicting interests with regard to the regulation of drinking water. 
Indeed, the Directive was adopted following five years of negotiations and over 50 
meetings (see CEC, 1975; CEC, 1980).  
 
It is notable that England/Wales and Ireland entered into a bargaining process in a 
desire to protect themselves from legislation that was felt to be creating a water 
quality ‘problem’ with regard to the concentration of lead in drinking water. For 
example, the comments of a former senior scientist of the Water Research Centre 
(WRc) in England/Wales serve to highlight the desire of civil servants to achieve 
flexibility on how the lead standard of the Directive would be applied:  
‘When the Drinking Water Directive was being drafted, the Department of 
the Environment facilitated the undertaking of a survey on lead in 
drinking water…the results were thought to be quite shocking by those 
involved in the negotiations…the UK subsequently lobbied hard in this 
area for a more sympathetic sampling regime’ (Senior Scientist WRc 
[England/Wales], per. comm.). 
 
It was subsequently argued by the same interviewee that this resulted in Directive 
80/778/EEC being worded loosely to allow Member States flexibility in applying the 
Directive: 
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‘The Drinking Water Directive was in the end worded loosely, it would 
have been stupid to clobber ourselves with legislation that was too 
strict…well, that was very much the attitude of those involved in the 
negotiations’ (Senior Scientist WRc [England/Wales], per. comm.).  
 
According to Winter (2003), a key consequence of policy negotiations, and the 
bargaining that ensues, is that it discourages clear definition of policy goals and the 
use of vague terminology. Why vague terminology may result as a consequence of 
policy negotiations is commented upon in detail by a House of Lords Committee on 
the European Community (HOLSEC) report on the application of EU environmental 
legislation in the UK. In particular, the report suggests that vagueness occurs in the 
context of EU policy because of the differing political and economic impacts 
legislation has on Member States, and the subsequent discretion it allows in a nation 
state response: 
‘if there are major differences in the political or economic impacts of a 
specific piece of legislation on Member States, vagueness may well be 
essential for reaching harmonisation…vagueness allows for a degree of 
desirable national discretion and hence for factors such as differences in 
capacity and perception’ (HOLSEC, 1992: 11) 
 
Indeed, the text of Directive 80/778/EEC is littered with vague terminology. For 
example, in relation to monitoring, the Directive is vague about how often and with 
which methods drinking water should be tested for compliance with the standards of 
the Directive, and which factors may have a negative impact on the quality of 
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drinking water. The following excerpts from the Directive clearly illustrate these 
examples of vagueness:  
‘Member States shall take all necessary steps to ensure regular 
monitoring of the quality of water intended for human consumption’ 
(CEC, 1980: 13). 
 
‘The competent national authorities of the Member States will determine 
the parameters according to circumstances, taking account of all factors 
which might have an adverse affect on the quality of drinking water 
supplied to consumers’ (CEC, 1980: 24). 
 
The vagueness of phrases and terms such as ‘all necessary steps’ and ‘determine the 
parameters according to circumstances’ have allowed England/Wales and Ireland 
considerable flexibility in interpretation. More specifically, the Departments of the 
Environment in England/Wales and Ireland chose to interpret the ‘Maximum 
Admissible Concentrations’ (MACs)3 specified by Directive as annual averages. For 
example, in 1982 the DoE in England/Wales stated that MACs were:  
‘The maxima to which average concentrations may rise without an 
expectation of ill effect in the population in general’ (Circular 20/82 DoE 
[England/Wales]: 3). 
 
The Irish Department of the Environment similarly stated that: 
                                                 
3
 MACs indicate the concentration beyond which a certain substance, specified in 
Directive 80/778/EEC, is not allowed to occur in any given sample.  
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‘An average value from routine samples, taken from a water supply 
system as a whole, over a period of time, does not breach the prescribed 
value’ (Circular L.6/83 DOELG [Ireland]: 6, emphasis in original 
document). 
 
Although the Directive does not give any guidance on the interpretation of MAC 
values (see CEC, 1980), subsequent action by the Environment Commission forced 
Member States to change their stance. This clarification of how MAC values should 
be interpreted is indicated clearly by the Irish Department of the Environment in a 
circular accompanying the European Communities (Quality of Water Intended for 
Human Consumption) Regulations, 1988: 
‘The Commission has indicated that there is no basis in the Directive for 
the advice about averaging values given to sanitary authorities in 1983 
and that the Directive prohibits any value above a maximum admissible 
concentration…The Department has raised the practical operational 
aspects of this requirement with the Commission, however, pending 
further developments, the advice given in 1983 on this matter is now 
withdrawn, and to comply with the Regulations it will be necessary to 
show that the result from each sample do not breach the prescribed 
standards’ (Circular L6/88 DOELG [Ireland]: 2). 
 
As a result of this ‘misinterpretation’, England/Wales and Ireland were not compliant 
with the standards of the Directive, indeed their stance towards MAC values had led 
them to believe they would be fine, as the comments of a former water company 
chairman in England/Wales typify: 
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‘The industry felt that it would be fine and would be able to comply with 
few problems, especially as the standards were thought to be applicable 
in annual means, which led one to believe that such substances as Nitrate 
would not be a problem’ (Former Chairman of Water Company 
[England/Wales], per. comm.). 
 
This view is further supported by a former senior executive of Thames Water who, in 
reference to MAC values, stated: 
‘The Drinking Water Directive Nitrate parameter took Thames by 
surprise. Originally we thought we would comply with the upper limit and 
get away with it’ (Senior Executive Thames Water [England/Wales], per. 
comm.). 
 
The argument that there was a need for Member States policy-makers to compromise 
during policy negotiations and thus appease conflicting interests is supported by the 
work of Haigh (1998). In particular, he has commented that the need for unanimity in 
adopting the Directive resulted in the text of the Directive being littered with 
examples of vague terminology. Therefore, the vagueness of the Directive’s text 
serves to shed light on why England/Wales and Ireland exhibited problems and delays 
in the application of the Directive, as it permitted incorrect national responses to the 
application of the Directive to take hold. 
 
Causal theory and the Directive 
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Directive 80/778/EEC has been alleged to be ‘technically deficient’ in certain areas, 
most notably with regard to quality standards it set for pesticides. In particular, the 
now defunct Water Authorities Association of England/Wales remarked in 1987 that: 
‘the Directive has had a beneficial effect in focusing attention on the 
quality of drinking water. Water quality experts across Europe agree with 
the aims of the Directive but it is a complex document and many feel that 
it has a number of technical deficiencies. These have led to differences in 
interpretation and implementation between different Member States and 
hence the well publicised action by the Environment Commission’ (WAA, 
1987: 2). 
 
In reference to particular deficiencies of Directive 80/778/EEC, a former Director of 
Quality and Environmental Services of Severn Trent Water commented that: 
‘One of the major deficiencies of the Directive is that it gives no scientific 
justification for any one of the standards. This is in contrast to WHO 
guidelines where the evidence on which the guideline values are set is 
fully documented. By present-day knowledge, the MACs for a number of 
parameters are highly dubious. For example there seems little 
justification for the EC nitrate standard which is not even included in 
WHO guidelines. Similarly it is clear that a single pesticide standard of 
0.1 μg/l is toxicologically indefensible for the wide range of individual 
compounds which it covers’ (Breach, 1989: 326). 
 
This approach to the regulation of pesticides in drinking water has been cited by some 
within the water industry as being irrational and unscientific. In particular, 
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interviewees highlighted that the total limit standard of 0.5 μg/l, and the blanket 
0.1 μg/l for individual pesticides were scientifically flawed because they take no 
account of the fact that certain pesticides can occur at higher levels without impacting 
upon human health: 
‘The standards adopted for the pesticides parameter were stupid, not all 
pesticides are the same’ (Senior Representative WAA, per. comm.). 
 
‘Some of the parameters in the Directive are not scientific, for example 
pesticides. The values adopted are too severe…the standard could be 
higher and still be able to protect public health’ (Senior DWI II, per. 
comm.). 
 
‘The main problems of the Directive are that some of the standards are 
unscientific’ The core celebrity in this case is the pesticide standard which 
owes more to limits of detection than public health impacts’ (Senior 
Ofwat Representative, per. comm.). 
 
It was subsequently suggested by some interviewees that the standards set for 
pesticides owed more to the limits of detection and a desire to push such sampling 
limits than to any specific scientific rationale:  
‘Many of the standards included in the Directive were technology driven, 
if you could measure them then there was an attitude of “lets include 
them”…this was certainly not scientific’ (Senior Civil Servant II DoE 
[England/Wales], per. comm.). 
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‘Some of the sampling limits in the Directive were based on the sampling 
limits of the time, they were in effect surrogate zeros that did not have any 
epidemiological founding, pesticides is a notable example’ (Senior 
Engineer Fingal County Council [Ireland], per. comm.). 
 
‘The vast majority of standards in the Directive are scientific but notable 
exceptions are pesticides and solvents. The 0.1 μg/l limit for indivividual 
pesticides is the equivalent of a surrogate zero, it was the detection limit 
at the time of negotiations’ (Eureau Drinking Water Representative, per. 
comm.). 
 
Concerns surrounding the scientific integrity of the Directives’ standards did not only 
emerge during the Directive’s application in Members State, and should not be taken 
as being a sign of disgruntlement because Members States, like England/Wales and 
Ireland, were struggling to meet the standards laid down by the Directive. For 
example, the 1976 Economic and Social Committee report on the draft version of the 
Directive is notable because it expressed concerns about the scientific validity of the 
Directive’s standards at the time of its development:  
‘...in many instances the standards are much stricter and the Section 
[Committee] wonders what justification there is for this [...] there is no 
indication of how they relate to the existing standards in the Member 
States’ (ESC, 1976: 6). 
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Why a more scientific argument for standards did not prevail is arguably due to the 
apparently negative impact of politics, as the following interviewee comment 
suggests: 
‘It was wrong for the Directive to have been drafted with political people 
being involved. The wrong approach was adopted and trade offs were 
made which weren’t to the benefit of the Directive. There should have 
been more technical input…Brussels did not have a clue on how to go 
about preparing a drinking water directive’ (Senior Scientist WRc 
[England/Wales], per. comm.). 
 
In relation to the accusation that there should have been more technical input, support 
is forthcoming from the recorded comments of Lord Bethell, the then European 
Parliament’s rapporteur for the Directive. At the time of the Directive’s development 
he drew attention to the environment committee’s poor understanding of the science 
involved in establishing the standards of the Directive:  
‘I would mention in passing that the Commission’s document is a little 
difficult for parliamentarians to get a total grip of: as in so many of these 
documents, we find ourselves in committee blinded by science; and not 
entirely equipped for getting to grips with what are quite complicated 
chemical matters. We can of course take advice from experts, but this is 
not always easy to do and we have not been able to go into the real details 
of the chemical problems of this proposal’ (CEC, 1976: 171). 
 
The accusation that some of the standards contained in the Directive were less than 
scientific, and were based upon incomplete knowledge and the actions of politicians 
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and thus invalid causal theories, is further substantiated by a series of articles that 
appeared in the Times Newspaper in England/Wales during the early 1990s. In 
particular, the scientific basis of the standards set by the Directive began to be 
questioned due to emerging and increasing concerns relating to how much the 
consumer would be willing, or able, to pay for the treatment processes necessary to 
remove pesticides to the standards set by the Directive: 
‘The EC standards, particularly on eliminating pesticide and nitrate 
traces, demand purity approaching perfection. The pesticide and nitrate 
standards reflect scientific caution rather than knowledge’ (The Times, 
14/08/1992). 
 
‘The director-general of water services said standards expected by 
Brussels were “not all scientifically based, and you could say they were 
politically based”. A substantial burden was placed on customers without 
full costing at an early stage’ (The Times, 30/03/1993). 
 
‘Mr Byatt [director-general of Ofwat] accused Brussels and 
environmentalists of setting utopian goals for EC tap and river water 
standards. Some of Europe’s existing and planned obligations offered 
little or no tangible benefits to customers’ health or the environment and 
were formulated by ideology rather than science, he said’ (The Times, 
14/07/1993). 
 
The research undertaken in Ireland did not reveal such a vocal debate about the 
scientific integrity of the Directive’s standards, particularly as a result of the costs 
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involved in complying with Directive’s standards. Why such concerns did not also 
manifest themselves in Ireland may in part be due to the costs of drinking water 
treatment not being directly borne by the consumers of water services in Ireland, as 
explained by the comments of a senior Irish civil servant: 
‘Domestic water users [in Ireland] don’t directly pay for water…if they 
did, there would be a higher level of concern over water quality and the 
resultant investment. This is probably why there has been a bigger debate 
in the UK over water quality costs’ (Senior Civil Servant II DOELG 
[Ireland], per. comm.). 
 
The above comment is to some extent supported by the research of Maloney & 
Richardson (1995) who suggested that when water services were paid out of general 
or local taxes in England/Wales, public concern about water services was low, which 
appears to be the situation in Ireland.  
 
A further area where valid causal theories can be seen to have been absent during the 
development of the Directive is apparent in the timeline adopted for full compliance 
with the standards laid down by the Directive. In particular, by July 1985, all 
signatories were meant to have been fully compliant but, as a manager from Thames 
Water remarked: 
‘The five year compliance timeframe was unrealistic…not enough 
knowledge or understanding of the water supply set-up may have led to 
this. For example, it took from 1989 until 1998 to deliver a programme 
for pesticide treatment’ (Manager Thames Water, per. comm.). 
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Support for the above accusation is forthcoming from a 1976 House of Lords report. 
This report argued, some nine years before full compliance with the Directive was 
due, that the Directive’s deadline for full compliance were ‘wholly unrealistic’, with 
many individuals still being supplied with water that failed to meet the standards of 
the Directive after this deadline (HOLSEC, 1976: 12). Why the Directive adopted an 
unrealistic compliance deadlines is attributed to those involved in the negotiations 
possessing incomplete information. For example, in the context of the pesticides 
standard, it has been argued that negotiators were not aware of the scale of drinking 
water contamination because sufficient sampling was not taking place, as the 
following interviewee comments serve to illustrate: 
‘The UK did think that some of the parameters wouldn’t affect them, for 
example pesticides…The UK didn’t try and negotiate against the pesticide 
standards because they were not perceived to be a problem at the time. 
This situation probably arose due to the fact that the UK were not testing 
for such a parameter’ (Senior Inspector DWI, per. comm.). 
 
‘A big issue with regards to implementation of the Drinking Water 
Directive was the pesticides standard…the problem was not known about 
during the negotiations…it took a while to realise pesticides were going to 
be a problem…this realisation occurred during the mid 1980s…the 
problem became apparent, as with other problematic parameters as the 
Directive increased levels of monitoring taking place to demonstrate 
compliance…which revealed the scale of the problem and the realisation 
that technologies had to be developed that could adequately treat water 
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and monitor for new pesticides on such a scale’ (Senior Inspector DWI, 
per. comm.). 
 
‘There was a gradual realisation that the Directive’s standards were 
being breached and this began to emerge via increased sampling…the 
response was not immediate as a response had to be developed over time 
via the testing of new technology…the approach to the Directive was very 
much “learn by doing”’ (Senior Engineer, Dublin City Council, per. 
comm.). 
 
While these comments do not support the conclusions of the 1976 HOLSEC report, 
one is left wondering how much civil servants did know about nitrate and pesticide 
contamination in England/Wales, and why they signed up to a Directive that was 
known to have unrealistic compliance deadlines. With respect to this issue, it is 
apparent that Directive 80/778/EEC was viewed in an ‘aspirational’ light, by senior 
government officials in England/Wales and Ireland, with legality being poorly 
appreciated by government officials in both national contexts. However, as the 
following section highlights, the Directive was seen by many as being politically 
symbolic which helps to explain the apparent willingness of policy-makers and 
politicians to sign-up to an apparently imperfect policy response. 
 
Policy symbolism and the Directive 
At the time of the negotiations surrounding the Directive, England/Wales and Ireland 
had only recently joined the EU and, as a consequence, there was an apparent desire 
by politicians, in both cases, to demonstrate progress and a positive attitude towards 
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the EU by signing up to new legislation. For example, it is notable that Neil 
Summerton (a former Head of the Water Directorate in the Department of the 
Environment) has argued that the Directive owed more to the wider political project 
of the EU rather than concerns about trade in water: 
‘Drinking Water…is rarely, if ever traded across national boundaries and 
standards at the tap do not have transboundary implications. The 
argument that Europeans should enjoy the same standards at the tap 
wherever they go in Europe owe more to the European political project 
than to transboundary and single market arguments’ (Summerton, 1998: 
111).  
 
The following interviewee comments are clearly indicative of the desire of politicians 
in England/Wales and Ireland for the EU to succeed and for progress to be 
demonstrated, which were in part due to the perceived monetary benefits membership 
would bring:  
‘Member State governments want to demonstrate progress, and progress 
is often demonstrated by signing up to new legislation. No one wants to be 
seen not to be progressing’ (Senior Civil Servant III DOELG [Ireland], 
per. comm.). 
 
‘The willingness to sign up to the Directive was high. One must remember 
that the general attitude in Ireland was that it was benefiting from the EU 
and didn’t want to be seen to be rocking the boat and thus upsetting the 
paymasters by questioning too much’ (Senior Civil Servant I DOELG 
[Ireland], per. comm.). 
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‘The UK may not have voiced its concerns as it had recently joined the 
EU and wanted it to succeed’ (Senior Civil Servant III DoE 
[England/Wales], per. comm.). 
 
With regard to the factors that drove Member States to resolve their conflicting 
interests, it is notable that interviewees remarked on the wider political symbolism of 
the Directive, with adoption being viewed as signifying progress towards the wider 
European project of closer political ties and economic integration, as the following 
interviewee remarks substantiate: 
 ‘There is always pressure to agree at the Council of Ministers level, 
which can make it difficult for ministers to reach a truly balanced 
decision. A Council of Ministers meeting is often held to achieve progress 
and there is consequently a strong desire to demonstrate this by adopting 
new legislation. As a result of this pressure compromises are made’ 
(Senior Civil Servant III DoE [England/Wales], per. comm.). 
 
‘At the time of the Directive’s negotiations there was a great will to get 
the Directive past with compromises being reached where necessary. 
There was a desire to demonstrate progress, particularly at the political 
level’ (Senior Civil Servant II DoE [England/Wales], per. comm.).  
 
Policy-makers’ attention and the Directive 
With regard to the development of Directive 80/778/EEC, a number of differing 
issues have been identified as potentially affecting the level of attention policy-
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makers may have been able to afford to the development of the Directive. In 
particular, in Ireland, an interviewee suggested that because of the small size of the 
civil service, the attention sometimes afforded legislation was limited because of the 
resultant time pressures: 
‘One must remember that the pressures on the civil servant are 
particularly acute in Ireland. The civil service is small in comparison to 
other countries and therefore it was often the case that civil servants and 
ministers would have had a wide range of issues to contend with that were 
perceived as being more pressing than drinking water…consequently an 
Irish minister would sign up quite happily without thinking about the long 
term consequences…Often there was an element of struggling to keep up 
with the raft of new legislation coming from Europe, there was a tendency 
to be on the back foot’ (Senior Civil Servant I DOELG [Ireland], per. 
comm.). 
 
From the perspective of England/Wales, it was suggested that, at the time of the 
negotiations surrounding the Directive, civil servants did not appreciate the 
bargaining process inherent in EU policy making. This subsequently resulted in 
legislation that was not wholly in agreement with the UK’s interests and thus in part 
explained subsequent problems of application: 
‘One may have signed up to Directives in the beginning without 
necessarily appreciating wider bargaining processes that were happening 
which may have allowed the development of policy that was not 
necessarily in agreement with states’ interests, or as much as it could 
have been’ (Senior Drinking Water Inspector III, per. comm.). 
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‘There was a profound ignorance of how the EU worked both on a day to 
day basis, the Department (of the Environment) didn’t understand the 
bargaining and trading that took place when agreements were being 
decided upon…with regard to the Directive, they didn’t fully understand 
what they were getting into. To begin with the UK was very bad at 
negotiations, the UK approach tended to be issue based…they couldn’t be 
seen to tie it in with other issues and bargain…other Member States, 
particularly France and Germany were playing a much broader game’ 
(Senior Civil Servant III DoE [England/Wales], per. comm.). 
 
Therefore, one can argue that the attention of civil servants in England/Wales to the 
negotiations surrounding the Directive was lacking because they were unaware of the 
EU policy making process. As mentioned previously, this has been found to be 
associated with problems of application relating to a misinterpretation of MAC values 
and the legal standing of the Directive. Also, as demonstrated by numerous annual 
reports on drinking water quality (see DWI, 1991–2003; EPA, 1991–2003), 
England/Wales and Ireland have been in continual breach of the standards set by the 
Directive for drinking water quality, in part as consequence of their misinterpretation 
of MAC values. However, it is notable that when senior civil servants and water 
industry personnel in England/Wales did increase the ‘attention’ they paid to issue of 
MAC values, particularly when the industry was being prepared for privatisation, it 
became apparent to them that their incorrect interpretation had major ramifications for 
future investment decisions within the water industry post-privatisation. With regard 
to the consequences of this increased attention, it is notable that during the first 
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Assessment Management Plan period (1989–1995) that followed water privatisation 
in England/Wales, upwards of £6,000000000 was invested in upgrading water 
treatment and distribution systems aimed at improving compliance with the quality 
standards of EU water directives, not least Directive 80/778/EEC (see Jenkins 2010a).  
 
The Directive and the allocation of duties and resources  
Effective policy design consists of a series of goals, instruments for achieving goals, a 
designation of bodies charged with delivery of goals, and an allocation of resources 
for necessary actions (Winter, 2003). With regard to the Directive, it is notable that it 
did not specify what bodies were to be charged with delivery of goals, or the 
allocation of resources necessary to ensure effective application (see CEC, 1980). In 
the context of the EU, this is delegated to Member States and, therefore, results in 
such policy decisions being taken at a national level. This response has accorded 
England/Wales and Ireland great flexibility in how they have chosen to apply the 
Directive, as an interviewee remarked: 
‘The freedom of the directive as the policy instrument was of tremendous 
importance to Member States, the freedom of process was very important 
as it enabled Member States to interpret and implement the Directive as 
they saw fit’ (Senior Civil Servant II DoE [England/Wales], per. comm.). 
 
However, and as highlighted earlier, this ‘freedom of interpretation’ is associated with 
problems of application, particularly with regard to correctly interpreting and 
fashioning an appropriate national response to the Directive. Indeed, previous 
research by the author has shown that when such ‘freedom of interpretation’ combines 
with issues of political ‘priority’ and ‘ideology’ at the national level, very different 
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organisational responses to the application of EU water directives can emerge which 
can lead to very different policy outcomes, such as the ability (or not) to meet the 
quality standards specified by directives (see Jenkins, 2010a and b).  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought to develop an understanding of how the policy development 
stage of the Drinking Water Directive (80/778/EEC) may have affected its application 
in England/Wales and Ireland. As a result, it is argued that some useful insights into 
how certain policy development issues can affect policy application have been gained, 
namely: conflicting interests, invalid causal theories, political symbolism, lack 
attention by policy-makers, and the allocation of duties and resources. 
 
From the perspective of England/Wales and Ireland, it was found that the 
development of the Directive was the subject of conflicting Member State interests 
that in part stemmed from the implications of certain water quality standards being 
adopted. From a comparative perspective, it was found that political symbolism and 
the level of attention accorded the policy negotiations of the Directive may have had 
quite differing rationales or factors behind them. However, regardless of any such 
differences, a lack of attention and political symbolism were found to be associated 
with problems of application in both contexts. It was also found, again due to 
differing reasons, that senior civil servants in England/Wales and Ireland were not 
able to dedicate as much attention as they may have otherwise wanted to to the 
development of the Directive. Finally, it was observed that the Directive’s vagueness 
with regard to what organisations should be responsible for during the Directive’s 
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application in Member States, and how they should be funded, was associated with 
delays and problems of application.  
Although this paper has sought to address the lack of knowledge within the water 
industry of how policy development can be construed as shaping the development and 
eventual application of drinking water policy, the discussion contained in this paper 
should not be taken as implying that considerable lessons have not been learned by all 
parties involved in the development and application of EU water policy. If reference 
is not made to this fact, this paper could be taken as implying wrongly that the policy 
development and application issues explored in this paper are still prevalent, 
particularly with regard to the preparations made for the current Drinking Water 
Directive (98/883/EC). Indeed, in relation to the development of Directive 98/883/EC, 
it is notable that civil servants and the water industry in England/Wales, and within 
Eureau, have sought to work far more closely with the European Commission, 
European Parliament and other Member State governments to try to ensure that many 
of the policy development deficiencies highlighted in this paper are addressed. For 
example, joint conferences between Eureau and the European Commission can be 
viewed as indicating a more attentive approach to policy development that is based on 
more informed judgements about the costs and practicalities of compliance.  
 
Despite this paper serving to generate an increased awareness of the policy 
development issues that can affect the application of water policy, a greater 
recognition of the political and/or economic interests of Member States, and the 
politically symbolic acts they result in, should be more openly recognised so as to 
facilitate the development of effective application responses that limit the potential 
downsides of political symbolism. Acknowledgement of this issue is arguably of most 
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relevance to newer Member States of the EU who are far less experienced in dealing 
with and appreciating the consequences of their policy actions at the European level. 
So, given that this study indicates that the time policy-makers were able to dedicate to 
the development of Directive 80/778/EEC was limited due to the size of the Member 
States’ bureaucracy and experience levels, it might be pertinent to suggest that the 
European Commission, in addition to targeting cohesion and structural funding at 
newer Members States, should also be seeking to identify ways in way it can boost the 
bureaucratic capabilities of newer Member States. The outcomes of any such policy 
response would then allow newer Member States to learn more effectively from the 
past mistakes of its older members and, in doing so, improve the application of 
European water policy and of other policy in general. 
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